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Abstract 
New institutional arrangements such as networks, partnerships and collaborations 
have come to constitute a significant part of the contemporary social and 
organisational architecture.  While there is a significant body of literature on 
organisational change and networks, little attention has been paid to consider the types 
of changes necessary to shift an organisation from what is often a traditional hierarchy 
to a ‘network organisation’.  This paper addresses the limited research into such 
change by ‘going behind the scenes’ of a public sector engineering organisation 
contemplating the strategic and operational change necessary to prepare for becoming 
a ‘networked organisation’. The paper draws on data collected from a large three year 
single case study to explore the elements and type of change necessary for a 
traditional, public sector organisation to shift its culture, behaviour and operating 
mode to best extract the benefits of collaborative networks. 
 
Introduction 
The shift to a network arrangements have arisen because changing social, economic 
and political conditions across the public, private and voluntary sectors have exposed 
the limitations of conventional bureaucratic and market-oriented forms of social 
organisation. It is argued that networked ways of working, with their emphasis on 
relationships as the ‘glue that binds’ (Powell, 1990) offer an alternative and effective 
way for these sectors to transform existing policy, product and service delivery 
models.  
 
Yet the popularity of networks and their widespread adoption has not been widely 
considered or examined within the context of an organisation’s motivation for their 
adoption or the change management needed to move organisations to this new mode 
of operation. Research has tended to focus instead on the establishment and 
maintenance of networks without investigation of the management decisions made 
before choosing to participate in or form a network. This paper addresses what 
motivates organisations to adopt networks, the elements of an organisation that are 
considered requisite to change and the change management strategies contemplated to 
transform an organisation to adopt a network model. 
  
To address these issues, the deliberations of a case study organisation’s senior 
management group (SMG) over a 30 month period are presented. Findings outline the 
underlying motivations to undertake change and the organisational characteristics the 
SMG considered it necessary to change.  
 
 
 
 
CHANGING TO A NETWORK APPROACH  
A network is a form of governance that contrasts with hierarchy and markets which 
respectively rely on formalised prescribed and legal contractual relations to coordinate 
elements. At its most basic a network is defined as the ongoing and relatively stable 
pattern of relationships that occurs between people, organisations and sectors. (Klijn 
and Koppenjan, 2001).Moreover, unlike hierarchies and markets, networks are 
essentially social, relying on the underpinning interpersonal relations of trust, 
reciprocity, mutuality and understanding established overtime to act as the conduit for 
collective action. It is contended that through these relationships dispersed people, 
resources and knowledge are better able to be connected- up; thus reducing the cost of 
coordination, limiting duplication and overlap and maximising finite resources.   
These basic aspects of networks are broadly understood through research that has 
predominantly focused on the development and sustaining of networks and the form 
such networks take. However, little examination has been undertaken in regard to how 
organisations come to the decision to network, what changes may be required within 
individual organisations to address the requisite capabilities needed for successfully 
participating in networks or the form such change may take. Organisational change 
literature is a vast field in terms of both empirical research and theory development. 
Most organisational change literature appears, however, to analyse three key issues (1) 
why organisations change, (2) how organisations achieve change and (3) what aspects 
of an organisation are (or should be) changed. 
Research has tended to take a retrospective view of network formation from the point 
at which a network actually forms. Despite the existence of a growing body of 
understanding of how networks work, a knowledge about why individual organisations 
choose to form networks and the decisions and actions required to adjust remains 
under-explored. Theories of why organisations choose to change have been dominated 
by contingency theories, arguing that organisations change because they operate 
within open systems and react to their environment (Barnwell 1994).  While normative 
studies have suggested improved performance as the reason for change, a number of 
different stimuli have been noted as a dynamic for organisational change.  Some 
organisations have responded to market crisis (see for example Pettigrew 1985).  
DiMaggio and Powell (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) have proposed that organisations 
practice mimetic isomorphism whereby they tend to imitate one another based, not so 
much on any evidence that doing so will improve performance, but rather driven by an 
urge to resemble one another.  Dunphy and Stace (1988) and Kondra and Hinings 
(1998) have suggested that organisations adopt change strategies to develop a better 
“fit” with their environment.  While such contingency theories continue to dominate, 
they have not been without their critics.  Criticism of contingency theories has been 
aimed at poorly defined linkages between size, structure and performance, that the 
influence of informal structures within organisations are ignored as has the notion that 
management may act strategically rather than reactively (Burnes 2000). 
The reasons why organisations change appears strongly linked in the literature to how 
organisations then choose to undertake change. Broadly speaking, models of change 
have ranged in terms of scale, change direction, pace and whether change occurs on an 
episodic or continuous basis. An organisation’s current condition within its context 
and its future desired state have tended to largely determine the type of change 
undertaken (Dunphy and Stace 1988). The main elements of change are summarised in 
the following table bearing in mind that these elements range across a continuum 
rather than being discrete elements and that various combinations may exist within 
each element.  
Table 1: Elements of Change 
SCALE CHANGE 
DRIVERS 
CHANGE 
DECISION 
PACE OF 
CHANGE 
VIEW OF 
CHANGE 
Transformational 
or Radical Change 
Top down 
Coercive 
Inspirational 
Contingent: 
Crisis response 
Better ‘fit’ 
Isomorphic 
 
Slow As an event 
Incremental 
Change 
Bottom Up 
Participative 
Normative: 
Profitability 
Efficiency gains 
Rapid As ongoing 
and 
continuous 
 Combination Strategic Intent   
 
The scale of change required depends upon the current state of the organisation and its 
desired future state. Scale refers not just to the extent of the change necessary, but also 
the target of change within an organisation. Large scale or transformational change 
involves changing not just components of the organisation but total structures, 
management processes and corporate cultures (Dunphy and Stace 1988).  Ashburner 
Ferlie, and Fitzgerald’s study of the National Health Service (Ashburner, Ferlie et al. 
1996) identified five factors inherent in large scale organisational transformations:  
1. the existence of multiple and interrelated changes across the system as a 
whole; 
2. the creation of new organisational forms at a collective level; 
3. the creation of roles at an individual level; 
4. the reconfiguration of power relations (especially the formation of 
new leadership groups); 
5. the creation of a new culture, ideology and organisational meaning. 
Conversely, incremental change may involve the simple altering of a small process or 
component within an organisation. The scale and target of change within organisations 
shifting to network arrangements is not well understood. 
 
Change drivers refer to the impetus and direction in which change occurs. For 
example, Dunphy and Stace (1988) have argued that where organisations are 
significantly out of fit with their environments, then change driven rapidly from the 
top of an organisation is warranted – that is rapid, top down change. Change may also 
occur organically from within the organisation from either its middle or lower ranks 
(Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
A recent, commonly held view of change has been the differentiation between change 
as an event and change as a continuous process. Where change is considered an event, 
the organisation describes a desired future state and plans a change program within a 
set time frame to attain that state. This assumes periods of stability where change does 
not occur. However, where change is viewed as a continuous process, change becomes 
a natural on-going occurrence. This type of change is commonly associated with the 
‘organisational learning’ school (Senge, 1992). 
Bringing together the literature on networks and organisational change, relationships 
are central to the operation of networks, there is little research into how organisations 
prepare to be relational or the extent of the change necessary to prepare for networked 
arrangements. The paper examines an organisation in the process of preparing to 
become a networked organisation. It explores how decisions are arrived at to 
undertake this shift and the extent of the change necessary to begin development of a 
model of organisations transitioning to networked arrangements. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The research was conducted as a three year longitudinal case study of a large, public 
sector organisation.  The complexity and size of the organisation as well as the 
longitudinal nature of the study resulted in a number of embedded cases arising from 
a single case study (Pettigrew, 1979). The overall design of the research presented 
here sought captured these multiple cases through a series of focus groups and 
interviews conducted at multiple sites at discrete time frames to observe the diffusion 
of change throughout all levels of the organisation from the Senior Management 
Group (SMG) through to operational staff on the ground. 
 
Data was collected at four discrete time frames ranging from six to nine months apart. 
The primary means of data collection were focus groups and interviews conducted 
with a large cross-section of employees. This included focus groups and interviews 
with senior management, middle management, district and head office staff and 
various occupational groups. 63 focus groups and 54 interviews were conducted in 
total over the period and various departmental documents, both public and intra-
departmental were perused.  
The Case Study Organisation 
The case study organisation is the Queensland Department of Main Roads (Main 
Roads). Main Roads is a large state government department responsible for the 
management and development of the state-controlled roads (Main Roads 1997/98). 
The department is regionally dispersed with fourteen district offices and operates 
through a functional hierarchy whereby different divisions within the department 
report to divisional heads within a senior management group headed by a Director 
General. Main Roads employs approximately 3,500 staff and is divided almost in half 
through a purchaser-provider arrangement. Under this arrangement the provider of 
construction services (RoadTek) operates as a commercial supplier of construction 
services to the “Corporate” arm that plans, coordinates and manages the road system 
for the state government. RoadTek competes against private sector contractors for 
large parts of its construction work.  The commercialisation of RoadTek was partially 
intended to refocus Main Roads away from their role as a builder of roads to a new 
role as a manager of the road network within the transport portfolio (Main Roads 
2003). 
 
The department has a long technical history. For the most part, the department’s 
Director General has been a civil engineer. At the time research commenced, however, 
government had broken with this tradition and appointed a non-engineer and 
professional manager as Director General. During the period of the study, the Director 
General headed a senior management group (SMG) made up predominantly of 
engineers. The profession has therefore both historically and to the present time 
dominated the decision-making processes and strategic direction of Main Roads.  
 
The delivery of roads is a politically sensitive issue, particularly in the state of 
Queensland which covers an area of approximately 1.7m sq. kilometres and where the 
population is more regionally dispersed than any other state in Australia. Roads 
therefore form an integral part of the state’s infrastructure by connecting cities and 
towns, many of which are very remote.  The politically sensitive nature of roads was 
demonstrated in the 1996 election when a decision in regard to a major road corridor 
contributed to the overturning of a government that had previously held a significant 
majority (Waterhouse, Brown & Flynn, 2001). A major policy initiative of the 
Queensland Government has been the adoption of a whole-of-government agenda 
which requires government agencies that cuts across organisational boundaries to 
adopt a broader strategic focus in regard to the delivery of government services 
(O’Farrell, 2002). 
 
Findings 
In 2000, Main Roads implemented a major change initiative aimed at altering its 
function from a supplier of road services to a manager of the road network. The 
process by which this change was to be achieved was first documented at the ICM 
Strategic Planning Conference Canberra in 1998 (Department of Main Roads 1998).  
This outlined a prescribed process of change involving “three simple steps … 
assessment, followed by diagnosis and setting strategy.” (page 2).  Following 
diagnosis, a change model was designed which outlined three main foci – (1) to align 
processes across the department, (2) to focus on relationships and (3) to implement a 
balanced scorecard with particular attention paid to the quadrant relating to 
stakeholder satisfaction. These three foci became known as “The Three Frames” and a 
major communication project involving personal visits by the Director General, 
newsletters and posters was undertaken to spread the change message across the 
department. Site visits evidenced that the posters were widely displayed, although not 
often referred to in focus groups despite some general understanding of the change 
principles. 
 
An increased focus on community consultation prior, during and after construction of 
projects was considered a priority of the change program.  In this regard a Community 
Consultation Framework was established and a network of Communication Officers 
appointed to service all areas of Queensland to assist in community consultation, 
evaluating community satisfaction with Main Roads and to manage media 
relationships (Varghese 2000). The consultation framework was critical to the 
improvement of relationships with external stakeholders and thus an important 
component in the shift to networking. 
 
The focus on maintaining stakeholder relationships was a significant change to an 
organisation that previously had concentrated almost exclusively on engineering and 
technical excellence. A consistent theme noted across all focus groups, including 
administrative functions, was a culture of technical excellence.  When asked to reflect 
on the culture of Main Roads over the previous five years, focus group and interview 
respondents identified a department that maintained a proud technical heritage of 
building excellent roads.  Other departments were said to envy Main Roads because 
of the perception that Main Roads was given huge “buckets of money”.  This, it was 
said, contributed to Main Roads becoming arrogant and inward looking manifested in 
their autocratic approach to the delivery of roads.  It was acknowledged that little 
consultation or consideration of stakeholders other than motor vehicle users occurred: 
 
“We never even used to worry about giving anyone refuge when they were 
crossing the road, we used to have medians with slopes like that (steep vertical 
slope indicated).  Now we don’t do anything like that.  And we never considered 
any room on the pavement for bikes; cyclists they just weren’t even considered I 
guess.  They didn’t pay registration, so they had no right to be there.”  Focus 
Group 1/8. 
 
Therefore, the change in organisational focus to relationship building required a 
fundamental change in the way Main Roads conducted its business and thought about 
itself. At the commencement of research, however, this notion of relationships was not 
widely understood, nor was there significant acceptance outside its Head Office that 
the department needed to change either the way it did its business or its culture. For 
example, this comment in regard to the relational changes at a first round focus group 
from a junior engineer: 
 
“Yea (laughs), that’s all the touchy furry people you know (general laughter) 
that do all that sort of stuff.  It doesn’t have any effect on what we do.  Unless 
it has indirectly and they’ve slipped it in there and we haven’t realised it.” 
Focus Group 1/8. 
 
A central tenet of the new relational approach was the adoption of a “no-blame” 
culture. Throughout the research there was disparity among SMG members as to what 
this meant and the extent to which it had been, or should be, adopted throughout the 
department. An SMG focus group expressed frustration with people not being pro-
active because of “the rules, policy or the bureaucracy” but at the same time it was 
acknowledged that there were a “lot of people in the department that made things 
happen by taking calculated risks”. The SMG agreed that decisions made after 
sufficient and logical consideration would gain their support even where they went 
wrong, however people needed to be held accountable where insufficient 
consideration had been given to the consequences of decisions. At the end of the 
research the extent to which a “no blame” culture had been established was still 
questionable: 
 
“There’s not many rewards working for us to stick your neck out, there’s no 
positives to it, but if you want things to happen sometimes some people have 
got to be prepared to exercise their best judgment.” SMG4 
 
Early in the research a new Director General was appointed replacing the instigator of 
the change initiative. The appointment was met with considerable support as, unlike 
his predecessor, the new Director General was an engineer and therefore considered 
the ‘right type of leader for Main Roads’. Within Head Office there was a growing 
realisation that the future of Main Roads was seen as building on a base of technical 
excellence to include other areas of expertise and withdrawing from the building and 
maintenance of roads towards the more strategic focus of managing the road network. 
The new Director General was seen as a way forward in this regard: 
  
1: “The new DG has heaps of engineering experience and heaps of Main Roads 
experience.  There are lots of positives through this situation.  Get something back 
into the system which is more balanced and focussed. 
2: “Agree he is a good change, but would not want to stop the irrational stuff.” 
3: “Put the expertise back into the department.”  Focus Group 1/7. 
To address the strategic direction of the department, a need was identified to compile 
the road network strategy and get this distributed.   This would then “set the change 
for the next paradigm in Main Roads”, clarify the higher order values of the 
department and set a broad strategic direction.  The SMG at this stage were still 
unclear as to whether this would involve incremental change along the same theme as 
had been started or whether major changes needed to be undertaken.  In this, 
government was seen as a major influence: 
 
“Broad objectives of the department need clarification over the next few months.  
Some of this will come from government direction or redirection  … whether we 
have some choices on this side or whether there are some governmental guidelines 
that will give us some guidance.”  SMG2. 
 
Eighteen months after the commencement of the research the SMG finalised the 
Strategic Plan but this had not yet been delivered throughout the department.  The 
SMG commented that previous plans had tended to encourage a focus on the sections 
pertaining to individual areas whereas this plan forced a broader perspective in 
viewing how each area fitted into the overall picture.  The previous plan had presented 
nine key result areas with four of these dedicated to managing the road network and 
five dedicated to managing the organisation (Main 1999).  The new Strategic Plan 
made no differentiation between these two areas and was strongly focussed towards 
Main Roads’ role in the road network as part of the broader transport portfolio. This 
was a substantial shift for the department in documenting what its main role was to 
be.  Into the future, the Strategic Plan set the stage to move Main Roads away from its 
focus on construction and maintenance and towards a role as a manager of the 
transport network: 
 
“I expect, to come back to a five year view, to have a much stronger focus on 
operating in a network rather than building things, a much stronger view as to 
how the total transport system works and how the road network works, so we 
start to manage the system rather than the projects.”  SMG3. 
 
Despite the non-delivery of the formal strategic plan there was some understanding 
through Main Roads of the intended strategic direction towards networking. However, 
focus group respondents identified that this direction needed to be better translated 
into the working documents and daily routines of departmental staff to make them 
more meaningful.  To achieve this, staff in all areas felt that senior management 
needed to personally deliver strategic documents in a language that could be 
understood, was relevant to their day to day lives and could demonstrate how 
operational changes fitted into the strategic direction: 
 
“If this is a change we need to know why we need to have it and what are the 
benefits.”  Focus Group 3/1. 
 
The result of not translating strategic direction in understandable language was that 
many considered that the department had no strategic direction.  Districts in particular 
considered that the department was not proactive and that it was changing only in 
reaction to outside forces.   
 
The principal message that emerged from the third SMG focus group was the need to 
present a united front and to ensure that Main Roads too acted as a network.  In this 
senior management had involved other senior managers in projects within their own 
individual areas.  Presenting a clear direction through visible consistency amongst 
SMG members was seen as the means by which the new vision for the department 
could be successfully disseminated.  
 
The focus across the department was shifting to networks and alliances throughout the 
period of the research.  Main Roads entered into a number of alliances including 
research and development with universities and a strategic alliance with the asphalt 
industry.  The most significant alliance was that with the Local Government 
Association of Queensland and it was planned to develop this association further.  In a 
time of shrinking budgets it was seen as a priority that local governments were 
involved in the prioritisation of works and were kept appraised of the constraints 
under which Main Roads was operating.  Ultimately the alliance sought to cede to the 
councils greater decision-making over roads in their local areas that, legislatively 
only, came under the jurisdiction of Main Roads.  The sharing of power is identified 
as a key, if difficult to achieve, network attribute (Mandell, 2001). It was considered, 
however, that Main Roads generally was not yet ready for such a significant 
relinquishment of “power” but that the alliance was a way forward to more efficient 
operations: 
 
“The alliance will be the framework where it will set out everybody’s role and 
responsibilities and what everyone has to do.  So it’s working together rather than 
banging our heads together.”  SMG3. 
 
A change aimed at addressing some of the ingrained bureaucratic cultures within the 
department was also mooted, primarily to overcome some of the tensions that had 
developed between Corporate and RoadTek, the commercialised construction arm of 
the Department.  There was also external pressure from government to draw RoadTek 
back a little from its increasingly commercial focus to allow it to fulfil its role in the 
whole-of-government agenda, in particular the government’s employment objectives 
in remote areas. RoadTek was therefore under pressure to meet both government 
objectives and commercial outcomes. The tension between the two divisions had 
occurred due primarily to these commercial imperatives placed on RoadTek which 
RoadTek staff felt were not understood or catered for by Corporate who continued to 
focus on government priorities. This was evidenced in the two divisions’ approach to 
project management. While both parts of the department were said to be adopting 
project management, RoadTek was being judged on its ability to turn a profit out of 
project management while Corporate was focussed on meeting government objectives 
often creating project delays for RoadTek. Corporate consulted widely with the public 
on the development of projects while RoadTek sought innovation through their 
involvement in project management through such actions as a successful joint bid 
with a major private sector contractor for the construction of a road bridge. 
 
The SMG in the final round of data collection discussed the rollout of the Strategic 
Plan and the release of a major strategic document Roads Connecting Queenslanders.  
These two strategic documents combined represented a long-term strategy that was 
more focussed than previous plans and that closed some options regarding the future 
of Main Roads.  Both documents clearly positioned Main Roads within the broader 
transport portfolio and, more broadly still, within the whole of government context.  A 
principal objective of the strategic documents was to alter the department’s role from 
being a builder of roads to being a manager of the road network.  This role was 
described as: 
 
“… not just about building and maintaining roads.  It is also about managing 
their use and operation, integrating roads with land-use planning, and 
providing roads as part of an integrated, sustainable transport system.” Roads 
Connecting Queenslanders p. 16. 
 
Relationships were considered integral in achieving the objective of becoming a 
manager of the road network.  This extended from Main Roads’ external relationship 
with other government agencies, the community, local councils and government to the 
internal relationships between Corporate and RoadTek, district offices and head office 
and technical and non-technical staff within the department. 
 
External relationships, particularly the building, or in some cases mending, of 
relationships with other agencies was considered particularly problematic due to 
departments being loath to surrender control of their territory.  Additionally, Main 
Roads’ earlier reputation for arrogance and “empire building” was considered a 
blockage to the achievement of better relationships with other agencies and the 
establishment of networks between work units and other stakeholder groups.  This 
was now seen to be changing and that training aimed at relationship skills had aided 
the change.  The need for a whole of government perspective was driven by an 
acknowledgement that the public did not concern itself with which department was 
responsible for issues.  To meet the public’s needs a cultural change that dismantled 
the demarcation of roles between departments needed to be achieved: 
 
“… at the end of the day the public just wants vehicles moved … they don’t 
care if it’s council’s road or our role or it’s the fire brigade … they want the 
thing done different so I guess it is the start of us giving away a bit of our 
power to work with others to get a better outcome …” SMG4. 
 
In some district offices their major consultations took place with industry.  These 
industry sectors often had strong political affiliations resulting in some districts 
dealing with particularly sensitive political situations that, in one case, resulted in the 
cancellation of a major federally funded project.  It was admitted that this poor result 
had been partly due to Main Roads’ inability to effectively consult and bring about a 
resolution between the affected parties. By the final round of data collection staff 
commented that Main Roads had now developed a better image with its public 
through consultation and had developed new methods of project delivery such as 
partnerships and alliances. These, it was argued, enabled Main Roads greater scope to 
deal with the issue of shrinking budgets while simultaneously satisfying the 
community.  Through consultation they could pre-empt public reaction and address 
issues before they arose: 
 
“I think the department is prepared to stand up more and let the public know there 
is not an unlimited bucket of money …  We have been building up alliances with 
local government, private enterprise and other departments in limited budgetary 
times.”  Focus Group 4/14. 
 
As part of the change initiative, networks within Main Roads were to be achieved 
through a greater utilisation of teams as a means of organising and undertaking work.  
In particular, the aim was to break down the divisional silos of the organisation. Yet it 
was clear that middle management at district level resisted the implementation of 
teamwork as they defended their power base through maintaining their focus within 
narrow designated areas.  Despite significant communication from the SMG in respect 
to the changes required, district managers effectively blocked these messages arguing 
that they did not relate to them: 
 
“I am not getting any messages from Senior Management, as I said nothing 
has been happening very much in the last six months … apart from funding for 
roads, which isn’t my area and the technical officer review which isn’t my 
area either.”  Interview, Middle Manager Administration, Round 3. 
 
Intra-organisational members therefore continued to operate within their own 
communities of practice and within their own frames and values. Consequently, they 
did not necessarily make the adjustment to the new network frame immediately. Part 
of the issue was that, whilst messages were being forwarded from Head Office 
regarding what was required, the processes were not sufficiently put in place to 
immediately support the new ways of working. 
An integral part of the process of shifting to a networked organisation was the 
alignment of systems and process across the organisation. Many years of autonomous 
district operations had led to each district establishing its own procedures. Systems 
differed between Head Office and districts. Despite IT system standardisation across 
the department the standardisation of processes was considered a major stumbling 
block to the adoption of project management and ultimately a network approach: 
 
“We have not yet accepted across the state that we need a common quality system.  
We still have people doing their own things in the districts.  We have agreed to the 
common system for about twelve months and are working towards it.  We were 
hoping to get some more departmental impetus.  It has been put on hold so we can 
explain the benefits.”  Interview 2/13. 
 
At the conclusion of data collection there continued to be blockages at middle 
management levels in regard to adopting a more relational way of doing business 
within the organisation.  Externally though, the notion of project management, 
networks, alliances and partnering was strongly adopted.  These changes were viewed 
as a permanent shift that included networked arrangements with a broader range of 
other bodies.  As this evolution took place it existed side by side with a continuation 
of the formal functional hierarchy. 
 
FINDINGS /ANALYSIS  
 
Drawing from the evidence presented in the case study the next section reports on the 
findings.  To address the paper’s goal particular attention is directed to drivers for 
change, change decisions and changed actions to align with a network model. 
 
Drivers for change/Change decision  
 
Top/down 
A major driver for change in the case study presented was driven from the top. There 
was an appreciation within Main Roads of the need to build both personal and 
departmental relations to progress the government’s whole-of-government initiative 
which formed a large part of the Premier’s agenda (O’Farrell, 2002). This top/down 
orientation to a relational approach was most noticeable within the Main Roads 
Corporate group. The location of this group, at a more strategic level of operation in 
government more closely linked them to the strategic policy agenda of government. 
 
The alignment with government policy tends to argue an institutional isomorphism in 
that Main Roads did not wish to draw attention to itself through a failure to adopt a 
whole of government perspective. There were underlying threats attached to any 
recalcitrance in this regard. The department identified that by practicing isomorphism 
some legitimacy could be established and their reputation with government assured 
thus staving off any major incursions into the department from external forces. In 
particular, the threat of forced major restructure, privatisation or amalgamation could 
be averted by ‘towing the line’. In this way it can be seen that institutionalism 
provided a strong foundation for the shift from siloed, hierarchy to relational networks 
as the way to undertake business.  
 
The argument for isomorphism is, however, somewhat simplistic. Whilst the whole-
of-government agenda set the main strategic direction, the means by which this was to 
be achieved was not directed by government. In the case of Main Roads the Director 
General acted strategically to an external threat through the design of a change model 
that would deliver the requisite outcomes but not necessarily lead to Main Roads 
looking like all other departments. There was recognition that the technical core 
needed to be maintained and that new cultural elements needed to be built on top of 
this. 
 
By comparison, the adoption of a networked way of working was adopted for 
different reasons by RoadTek. Whilst commercialisation had been directed by 
government, the division acted strategically in how it interpreted this. At a time when 
government was attempting to draw them back a little to a more traditional public 
service role, RoadTek saw cross-organisational relationships as the means to break the 
public sector shackles, drive profits up and gain technical expertise through partnering 
with private enterprise.  Therefore, the main driver in the case of RoadTek was more 
instrumental. That is, RoadTek were willing to engage in networks, not because they 
were mandated to or because they saw networks as the right thing to do, but because 
they saw networks as a practical way of product delivery through reducing duplication 
of processes. 
 
Bottom/up 
 
At the same time there was also evidence that some employees recognised the 
limitations of working in ‘silos’ and wanted to be more ‘networked’ to have better 
relations with colleagues in other units. Further, there was a growing realisation that 
improved relations across and between units and sectors was necessary to continue to 
meet the organisational objectives and personal goals of “building beautiful roads”.  
Accordingly, at this technical level an instrumental, pragmatic and interpersonal 
(professional pride) approaches were contributing factors to the uptake of a networked 
way of working.  In this way, it can be seen that even within the one organisation 
there can exist an array of orientations towards networks; each of which provides 
different rationales, operating frames and expectations. 
 
For both of these orientations – top/down and bottom/up, key initial considerations 
were the presence of a ‘will to change’ and the acceptance of a greater absorption of 
risk.  
 
Relations 
 
The focus of the change was on relationships both internal and external to the 
department. In regard to the former the department had a long history of informal 
networks that were highly exclusive in their membership. This closeness of the 
network based on prior knowledge, professional level and geographic location served 
to constrain membership. Through change processes aimed at formalising networked 
arrangements, the networks were opened up and became more inclusive facilitating 
alternative views and new information. 
 
In regard to external relations, the case study reveals that the organisation started from 
a position of relatively poor relations with external and internal stakeholders driven by 
the experience of ongoing silos, professional ideology, and organisational history.   
There was a realisation of a need to improve relationships in order to make the 
adjustments to work in a network model. The shift in relationships was evident in the 
way members considered each other and adopted a more collegiate approach to doing 
business. This was despite resistance from middle management. 
 
The focus on mending internal relationships was strong and indicates that the 
department understood it needed to alter its own behaviour before it could 
significantly change its relationship with external stakeholders. It is therefore 
surprising that Main Roads appeared to be more successful in its endeavours with 
external relationships than with internal relationships. This situation could be partially 
explained by strong internal and/or professional networks also described as 
‘communities of practice’ operating within the organisation that counteracted the 
acquisition of the necessary behaviours to successfully operate in a relational way. 
External stakeholders, on the other hand, were often already involved in networks or 
more relational ways of working and therefore were more experienced and 
comfortable with what was required. Reputation and accountability also appear to be 
explanatory factors in that, whilst behaving badly was acceptable with internal 
stakeholders who would not willingly damage their reputation; the same could not be 
said for external stakeholders who had more to gain, primarily financially, from 
projects extending overtime. 
 
Whereas previously the department had been reticent to share information that 
reflected poorly on their performance, they demonstrated the need to trust other 
organisations with information regarding fiscal constraints. There was recognition that 
an evolutionary process was required. Initially commencing with the simple sharing 
of information it was acknowledged that ultimately power must be ceded but at this 
time the organisation was not yet ready to achieve this. As a result, respondents 
identified benefits of improved collegiality; that is, not only brought groups together 
but contributed to an increased commitment to achieving goals. 
 
Changed perceptions actions/structures 
 
A further example of a step towards a network model can be seen in the recognition 
by organisational members of their interdependence. That is, they relied on each other 
to achieve collective goals. The development of a common goal and a common sense 
of purpose was an indicator of mobility toward this network aspect. The establishment 
of this ‘common mindset’ or commitment to a common goal is described by Mandell 
(1999) as the ‘program rationale’.  Program rationale, with its emphasis on securing a 
‘whole view’ provides the framework for a network mode and points to the types of 
behavioural and cultural adjustments that are required.  As shown in the case studies, 
organisational members spoke of adopting a ‘big picture’ of the organisation and how 
it was connected. This was graphically illustrated as a “shift from a view of individual 
parts to strategic level” (Interview). 
 
In this way the transference towards a new organisational culture was commenced. A 
weakness of the change program was that organisational members were unable to 
understand how changes in their day to day operations translated into the strategic 
direction. The disconnect between systems and processes has been identified as an 
ongoing issue for many networks (Keast and Brown, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, a range of network norms of interaction can be distilled from the cases. 
In particular, respondents highlighted the development of a new meta-language that 
was able to cut across previously autonomous working groups with particularistic 
languages, and facilitate communication.  Further, a no blame culture was instilled 
that sought to replace a more punitive approach.  By removing blame, the organisation 
sought to encourage open and more genuine communication. That is, members would 
be more willing to be ‘frank and fearless’ in sharing both positive and negative views.  
 
Additionally, the introduction of new staff members from various professional 
backgrounds provided the means to include perspectives that no always fitted with the 
traditional engineering view.  From a network perspective, this expanded opinion and 
skill base, changed the dynamics of the existing interactions and modelled new ways 
of thinking and behaving within the various networks.  Building on this diversity, a 
team based approach was implemented to facilitate the adoption of new business 
practices. Together these aspects of organisational change demonstrated an 
adjustment in prior operating procedures to a more horizontal orientation that began to 
break through organisational silos and profession enclaves to foster more egalitarian 
interactions.  Table 2, provides a summary of the core change processes that were 
distilled from the case study.   
 
Table 2: Summarising direction, focus and action  
 
CHANGE DIRECTION DECISION  FOCUS NETWORK ACTIONS 
Top Down Instrumental 
 Institutional 
Bottom Up Interpersonal 
  
Information Sharing 
Trust 
Power ceding 
Teams 
 
To expand, the change direction was both top down and bottom up, that is directed 
down from strategic decision makes as well as emerging from the practitioner floor. 
The decision making focus reflected the duality of the change direction, with three 
positions evident – instrumental (pragmatic), institutional (mandate) and interpersonal 
(collegiate). Finally, the case distilled a set of relational adjustments that were 
addressed in moving to the network mode.  
 
DISCUSSION  
 
A significant aim of the change program was the introduction of a relational way of 
doing business through the formation of intra and inter-organisational networks.  This 
was to impact on how Main Roads dealt with both their external and internal 
stakeholders.   
 
There is evidence throughout this study of changes in four of the six areas noted by 
Ashburner et al (1996).  Firstly, there were multiple and inter-related organisational 
changes such as the shriving off of RoadTek and numerous divisional realignments all 
aimed at breaking down functional silos and developing a broader whole of 
government perspective.  Secondly, the development of new organisational forms was 
evident in the shift to project management as an alternative to the functional hierarchy 
as the means of production.  This was further evidenced in the greater use of alliances 
and partnerships with “outsiders” as a mechanism for service delivery with an aim to 
shift the department further towards a networked structure.  Thirdly, a major focus 
throughout the change process was to initiate a consistent organisation-wide system.  
This was somewhat achieved by the end of the research. Fourthly, there was a 
noticeable creation of new roles within the department such as environmental, cultural 
heritage, native title and organisational development officers.  
 
The difficulty within the case study presented was that a reconfiguration of power 
relations and cultural transformation was deemed necessary if organisational members 
were to successfully co-operate with external stakeholders and project partners.  The 
initial attempt by senior management to alter the structure of Main Roads away from a 
functional hierarchy to a more networked arrangement seems to have met with limited 
success in fully shifting the locus of power away from engineering.  For the 
organisation as a whole, networked arrangements and strategic alliances were seen to 
offer both an arena for the ceding of power, but an opportunity to gain power through 
central positions within networks. Even the title “manager of the road network” 
suggests the department was not well prepared to engage in equal relations with its 
network partners. In this way, it could be argued that while the organisation and its 
members understood and mentally accepted the need to network, they had not fully 
embedded the network processes within practice, or worse had not yet fully 
committed to the mode.  
 
Overall, this suggests only a limited reconfiguration of power relations but that the 
most significant locus of power, held within the engineering profession, remained 
relatively immune to major change.  The focus of the department is changing from a 
road builder to a broader role of managing the road network.  This has necessitated 
the employment of professionals outside the engineering profession that potentially 
may shift the professional power away from engineering. 
 
A significant aspect of the change in Main Roads is a change of strategy aimed at 
altering not just how an organisation does business, but what its main purpose is.  In 
the case of Main Roads rather than just creating new roles at an individual level there 
was a complete overhaul of the organisation’s principal role through a major shift in 
strategy.  For all its history Main Roads was an organisation that built roads.  What is 
most significant is that, with commercialisation, Corporate Main Roads no longer 
performs this function.  They have become a purchaser, rather than a provider, of 
roads.  Their role now, according to the SMG, is not in the construction of roads, but 
in the management of the road network as part of the broader transport portfolio. 
 
At SMG level and in management ranks directly below the SMG the new primary 
purpose of Main Roads was well understood.  Below that level the evidence suggests 
that this strategy was not well linked to what was occurring in people’s daily work 
routines.  Staff recognised the broader professional roles being adopted and the lack 
of control Corporate now had over the quality of roads constructed.  These were not, 
however, identified as belonging to the broader strategy of becoming a manager of the 
road network.  Employees identified that the department was taking increased 
responsibility in areas outside their direct area of expertise however there was little 
understanding of how these expanded roles were a direct result of the change of 
organisational strategy. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Main Roads, similar to many other organisations adopted a deliberative strategy based 
on enhanced relations and intra and inter-organisational networks to more effectively 
meet service delivery and outcomes. In effect there was a desired shift from 
technocracy to democracy. However, the move to networks is not always a 
straightforward endeavour. It is complicated by the existence of different change 
drivers and orientation as well as different levels for network formation. The resulting 
disconnect between the overall organisational change strategy and the actual 
implementation processes at various operatonal levels, points to the need to have a 
more nuanced approach to strategy.  Further, power-ceding in networks, how this is 
carried through from pre-network to network establishment and whether it can be 
maintained is a significant area for future research. Perhaps most importantly, the 
scale of the relational adjustments required to be established and sustained was under 
considered.   
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